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Analytic philosophy was refuted in the fall of 1932. In his lectures, Wittgenstein is 
reported to have said: 
“I have wanted to show by means of language-games the vague way in which we 
use “language”, “proposition”, “sentence”. There are many things, such as orders, 
which we may or may not call propositions; and not only one game can be called 
language.  Language games are a clue to the understanding of logic. Since what we 
call a proposition is more or less arbitrary, what we call logic plays a different role 
than what Russell and Frege supposed.1  
Analytic philosophy is the philosophical tradition that takes formal logic as the 
paradigm of meaning, and thus, of knowing.  Analytic philosophy arose out of this 
picture, and analytic philosophers, even if they consciously oppose it, are still trapped 
                                                          
1 Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge, 1932-35, edited by Alice Ambrose (University of Chicago Press, 1979), 
pp. 12-13 (emphasis added). 
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by it. 
Wittgenstein’s refutation, developed further in the Blue Book and Philosophical 
Investigations, joined the metaphilosophical discussions (to which the Tractatus had 
contributed in a major way) which were prompted by the rise of analytic philosophy.  
Although Lakatos’s term “progressive problemshift” may not actually be applicable, the 
metaphilosophical discussions were initially spurred by the confidence of the early 
analytic philosophers in their new approaches and new tools.  These metaphilosophical 
discussions, culminating in Rorty’s Linguistic Turn anthology, struck me as among the 
most interesting when an undergraduate. 
By that time, another round of metaphilosophical discussion was in full swing.  
This round was spurred by the challenges of non-Analytic traditions, especially 
Continental ones.  Actually, discussion was a pretty small part of what would better be 
called polemic and activity, the activity involving institutional maneuvers and career 
blocks.  Rorty was again a major player with Philosophy and the Mirror of  Nature.  This 
round was epitomized by the anthology After Philosophy.2 
By the time I was in graduate school, it looked like analytic philosophy would lose 
its preeminent position, and the whole world of academic philosophy would change 
over.  Of course, this never happened.  Analytic philosophy not only maintained and 
strengthened its position, it retrenched.  The philosophy practiced became even more 
analytic.  Metaphilosophical discussion pretty much disappeared.  This had the 
appearance, to again use terminology from Lakatos, of the avoidance and 
defensiveness of a degenerating problemshift. 
Metaphilosophy seems to be making a slight comeback.3  The appearance of the 
two books under review allow for a consideration of the current status of 
metaphilosophy and the analytic-Continental divide.  I will start by examining An 
Introduction to Metaphilosophy by Overgaard, Gilbert, and Burwood (OGB), and then turn 
my attention to the anthology Beyond the Analytic-Continental Divide—Pluralist Philosophy in 
the Twenty-first Century, edited by Bell, Cutrofello, and Livingston (BCL). 
 
*** 
Overgaard, Gilbert, and Burwood have provided what they believe is the first 
textbook for a course in metaphilosophy.  This is an important book, and mostly very 
                                                          
2 Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy, editors, After Philosophy (MIT Press, 1986). 
3 Two other recent books on the topic fully support the view that analytic philosophy has retrenched.  
Timothy Williamson, The Philosophy of Philosophy (Blackwell, 2008); David Chalmers and David Manley, 
editors, Metametaphysics—New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (Oxford, 2009). 
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well done.  The topics are well chosen and form an excellent framework for 
metaphilosophical discussion.  They are five:  “What is Philosophy?”;  “The Data of 
Philosophical Arguments”; “Analytic And Continental Philosophy”; “What is Good 
Philosophy?”; and “What Good is Philosophy?”  Each of these topics is a chapter title.  
Due to the importance of the first, the authors have wisely chosen to add two 
additional chapters which extend discussion of that topic.  One of these is “Philosophy, 
Science and the Humanities”; the other, concerning Rorty, is “Philosophy and the 
Pursuit of Truth.”  The book is well-written, with a low-key style which is appealing; 
however, a few striking examples would be welcome.4  Quotations are well-chosen and 
thought-provoking; a couple of significant ones, mentioned below, could be added.  
From the very beginning up to the end the authors show a laudable concern that 
philosophy not be mere “navel gazing”.  The argumentation is generally sensible.  
However, there are several flaws, one of which is quite grievous.  These will 
predominate in the remainder of my discussion, but I don’t want that to obscure the 
positive qualities of the book.  These flaws could be corrected with relatively little 
modification.  I hope that a second edition does so, and that it becomes a widespread 
reference point for metaphilosophical discussion.  Its importance exceeds the use it will 
have as a textbook. 
A.  WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? 
This chapter, and the two which extend it, focus on the comparisons of philosophy 
with science and the ensuing issue of progress in philosophy.  The predominance of 
naturalism is a guiding thread of the presentation.  Nine possible answers to the 
question posed are considered.  Philosophy is either:  part of science; immature 
science; ‘midwife’ and ‘residue’ of the sciences; ‘the study of some particularly ‘deep’ 
and intangible part of reality’ (Platonism); the logic of science; “a contribution to 
human understanding” (Hacker’s interpretation of the later Wittgenstein); 
transcendental inquiry; “world views”; or ‘edifying conversation’ (Rorty). 
Comparing philosophy to science requires that “we need to know what is meant by 
‘science’.” (p. 24)  This is the correct starting place.  In this discussion, they at the same 
time make things easier for themselves than they should and more difficult.  They 
                                                          
4 Sometimes the key is a bit too low.  The chapter on the virtues of philosophy opens with a restatement of 
the accusations made against Derrida by those objecting to his receiving the honorary degree from 
Cambridge University.  The context is one where the reader is likely to accept these accusations.  The few 
mentions of Derrida elsewhere in the book provide tentative suggestions that they should not be taken at 
face value. I would prefer that these suggestions were not so tentative, but regardless, a reminder in a 
footnote in the later chapter help out. 
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make things too easy for themselves by giving an empirical characterization of science 
(“very roughly, the attempt to determine the laws of nature by means of observation 
and experiment” (p. 24); also pp.46-47 re Renaissance).  I wholeheartedly agree with 
the empirical characterization (I am not sure about the “laws of nature” part), but it 
should be noted that many philosophers claim that the key aspect of science is entirely 
mathematical—either because mathematics is the “language of nature” or because 
science could be formulated as a formal system.  This isn’t captured by OGB’s 
treatment of the question of whether formal systems should be included as sciences, 
and needs to be discussed. 
They make things more difficult for themselves through an inadequate treatment 
of which disciplines count as sciences, thus mattering in our discussion of philosophy 
and science.  The problems that arise from the tendency to treat ‘science’ as meaning 
‘physical science’ are resisted only by a couple of qualifications in the first chapter and 
a footnote in the second.  These problems are never given the appropriate stress, and 
thus are easily missed and easily forgotten when science is mentioned later in the book.  
Quine’s qualification of the term ‘science’ is reduced to an aside and placed in a 
footnote: “We should note that Quine construes ‘science’ broadly and includes under 
this heading fields of inquiry such as economics, sociology and even history.” (p. 56)5 
Overcoming the equation of ‘science’ with ‘physical science’ was one of the major 
themes of twentieth century philosophy of science.  A full realization of this point 
would dramatically change how science is viewed by many.  The failure to give social 
sciences their due also surfaces in the failure to consider the possible legitimacy of 
philosophy as similar to some type of ‘social science’ with a cognitive status different 
from but equally legitimate to that of the natural sciences.  The distinction between 
understanding and explanation, which has been offered to support this view, is 
discussed by OGB in arguing for a legitimate epistemic status for the humanities and in 
their interpretation of Wittgenstein, but the connection to social science isn’t made. 
Another major theme of philosophy of science which is lost is the need to consider 
actual scientific practice, both historical and current, in discussions of science.  No 
mention is made of this, nor of the problems that result when this is ignored.  The 
phrase “secure path of science” is mentioned twice, but not explained.  A secure path 
would seem to be one that one is confident of continual and predictable forward 
movement.  Much progress in science has not proceeded that way.  Recently physics 
seems to have found itself in a cul-de-sac with String Theory, all math and no 
empirical support.  The belief that galaxies were moving away from each other with 
                                                          
5 Quine’s unwillingness to include linguistics is not discussed. 
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decreasing speed turned out to be an error, and a major one.  The lesson of the 
philosophy of science of the last century, explicitly drawn by Lakatos and Kuhn, is that 
rationality in science is retrospective.  Does this fit the image of a “secure path”? 
The authors draw a distinction between ontological naturalism and what they call 
methodological naturalism, aka reductionism.  They argue quite sensibly that 
ontological naturalism fails to imply reductionism.  This argument could be 
strengthened in a couple of ways.  In their discussion of primary and secondary 
qualities, they could cite the analyses which argue that no such distinction holds up.6  
Also, they should carry over their concern with “actually existing philosophy” to 
“actually existing science”, as discussed above.  Doing so makes it much more difficult 
to argue for strong reductionist ontological views as proven (as opposed to arguing for 
them as research programs).   
Of these disciplines which need further discussion, special mention should be made 
of history.  In the introductory chapter, they state that we need to consider “what sort 
of results we can expect” from philosophy “and, in particular, whether they are the 
same sort of results we get from science, history and other subjects which deliver truths 
about the world.” (p. 15)  Aside from the footnote quoting Quine mentioned above, 
history is never mentioned again and its epistemic status is never discussed.  This 
created problems throughout the book, as we will see.   
The question of progress and the lack thereof in philosophy is important, and many 
of the important points are well-discussed.  The idea of philosophy as “midwife” and 
“residue” of the sciences, one of the views of philosophy offered, is a conception which 
can be used to explain the seeming lack of progress in philosophy as a failure to give 
credit to philosophy for the progress which takes place.  Seeing philosophy as 
“midwife” leaves open the possibility that additional disciplines will spin off from 
philosophy in the future.  Seeing philosophy as “residue” allows one to see how 
philosophy is interstitial.   
This discussion could be tweaked a bit.  It could be portrayed as a continual 
process rather than a one-time occurrence (in the Renaissance).  Also, the view of 
philosophy as residue of the sciences gives rise to the idea of the heterogeneity of 
different parts of philosophy.  Such heterogeneity is important in any further 
discussion, since it makes general claims about philosophy more difficult to make, but 
also more difficult to refute.  This is the only view of philosophy offered which provides 
for such heterogeneity, and this possibility of heterogeneity could use more emphasis. 
                                                          
6 e.g. John O’Neill, “The Varieties of Intrinsic Value,” in Environmental Ethics—An Anthology, edited by 
Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston III (Blackwell, 2003), pp. 131-142, 136. 
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OGB consider one view that has been put forward which attributes the lack of 
progress in philosophy to psychological interests—specifically the quarrelsomeness of 
philosophers.  OGB rightly find that view implausible.  They should consider other 
ways psychology plays a role.  One view which could be considered is Hobbes’s.  
Hobbes thought that moral and political philosophy were hindered from the sort of 
progress and agreement achieved in mathematics because every question in moral and 
political philosophy involves a direct interest for all discussants.  Hobbes thought that 
mathematical questions don’t involve such interests.  I think that this is an interesting 
idea which would require little space and could be considered independently of 
Hobbes’s general epistemological views. Gilbert Harman presents another view that 
psychological interests have effects of metaphilosophical significance on the 
philosophical field.  He makes the interesting claim that most moral philosophers are 
moral universalists, and that moral relativism is relatively absent from the field, as a 
matter of self-selection because moral philosophy would simply not be an interesting 
subject to spend time on if one was a moral relativist.7  (This essay is also an interesting 
one to show how arguments for strong reductionist views rely on a floating conception 
of science, as careful reading shows that the meaning is limited to physical science to 
make the case for reductionism but broadened to include psychology elsewhere in the 
essay.)  These sorts of situation suggest that there could be a subfield of metaphilosophy 
analogous to the field of behavioral of economics. 
Unlike psychological impulses, which are mentioned, institutional incentives and 
imperatives are entirely absent.8  OGB, in their concern for dealing with “really 
existing philosophy”, note that they take the failure of a metaphilosophical claim to 
match any actually existing philosophy to be evidence against that claim.  They note 
that such widespread conflict provides evidence that the claim it concerns some 
endeavor other than philosophy.  However, they fail to consider the way in which 
beliefs about philosophy can become self-fulfilling prophecies if institutional hiring is 
based on them. Institutional imperatives are an important issue in Continental social 
theory, but are absent from analytic philosophy and phenomenology, and they are 
absent from this book.  If metaphilosophy is concerned with “really existing 
philosophy” and with fostering progress in philosophy, then it should consider 
institutional factors. 
                                                          
7 Harman, “Is There a Single True Morality?” in Moral Relativism—A Reader, edited by Paul Moser and 
Thomas Carson (Oxford, 2000), pp. 165-184. 
8 They could easily tie this in with their comments about what “disciplines” philosophy.  (p. 70)  Here they 
are referring to Timothy Williamson’s use of the phrase, which involves what philosophers consciously 
strive for.  I think it should be expanded to include what philosophers unconsciously lapse into. 
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One more point about progress in philosophy or the lack of it.  OGB state that 
“…it is still true that science is capable of delivering a surety of outcome that eludes 
philosophy. …It is not just that philosophy does not, as a matter of fact, achieve this 
degree of security for its conclusions but that such security is so alien to the subject that 
it would appear distinctly odd if a philosophical thesis were to claim it.  One might well 
wonder if such a thesis were a philosophical thesis at all.” (pp. 50-51)  Now consider the 
claim, “God doesn’t exist” and the further claim “Philosophical considerations 
conclusively prove that God doesn’t exist.”  These claims show that it is not distinctly 
odd for a philosophical thesis to claim this security.  Instead, I find it odd that they do 
not discuss this claim at this point.  In fact, they do discuss it just a few pages later, 
under the heading of naturalism.  There they discuss it in a way that seems to directly 
contradict what they have just said.  They begin by saying “Most contemporary 
philosophers—like the vast majority of natural scientists—accept some version of a 
view we can call ‘ontological naturalism’.” (p. 54)  This is a view OGB seem to agree 
with as they consider no challenging arguments and raise no doubts about it.  It is a 
view that says that “an accurate and complete description of the world” would not 
“include any reference to supernatural entities and powers.  So naturalist ontology does 
not include supernatural entities such as the gods, Platonic forms or Cartesian mental 
substance, nor any supernatural powers such as those exercised by Gods, angels and 
mediums.” (pp. 55-56)  So here is the sort of security for philosophical claims that they 
earlier say is alien to philosophy. 
Let us take a closer look at this contradiction.  There are two ways that I can see 
that would make the contradiction only apparent.  Perhaps they think that the 
naturalists are mistaken in their certainty.  If this were the case, they wouldn’t base 
their entire argument against the naturalists on the distinction between reductive and 
non-reductive materialism.  The other possibility is that they think that scientific and 
philosophical questions are mutually exclusive categories, and that the disproof of 
God’s existence is a scientific one, and not a philosophical one.  Bringing the question 
out into the open this way allows one to see that it can be both, and further discussion 
would show how philosophical and scientific/factual claims work together, as well as 
the continuity between philosophy and the sciences.   
Like the chapter on science, the chapter on Rorty (“Philosophy and the pursuit of 
truth”) is a continuation of this discussion.  Including this chapter was an outstanding 
idea, and it is generally well done.  I am no longer in a position to pass judgment on 
their presentation of Rorty, having stopped reading him at a certain point, but much of 
what I remember is here.  Their bibliography includes a list of essays by Rorty 
published after 1995, which would be very handy for those in my situation who wish to 
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return to his work. 
They parse Rorty’s claims as following from three theses: (1) pragmatic theory of 
truth; (2) contextual view of justification; and (3) contingency of language.  On one 
point, I think they fail to consider a conclusion which Rorty drew which is significant 
for their presentation.  I recall Rorty relying on the second of these to argue 
(persuasively, as far as I was concerned) for the epistemological continuity of the 
sciences, social sciences, history, ordinary claims, and philosophy.  If there is no 
unmediated contact with reality, then all truth-claims are interpretive.  This is of some 
significance as they treat Rorty as arguing for philosophy as poetry, in Heidegger’s 
sense of the term, and frame their discussion in terms of trying to find some middle 
position between philosophy as science and philosophy as literature.  A proper 
consideration of the second thesis might lead one to conclude that Rorty had either 
dissolved this problem or already found such a position.9 
The main criticism I would address to this chapter is in their treatment of 
Nietzsche.  They say they are talking about Rorty’s (and Vattimo’s) take on Nietzsche, 
and I cannot comment on that.  But they treat Nietzsche as holding a “world views” 
view of philosophy—that is as an anti-realist and relativist.  This definitely makes sense 
with regard to a couple of lines of thought in Nietzsche.  But there are other lines of 
thought which are clearly and unequivocally realist.  Given the anti-systematic aspects 
of Nietzsche’s philosophical views, it seems problematic to me to resolve Nietzsche’s 
views one way or another without extensive discussion of the texts.  One of their 
citations of Rorty shows the problem:  “And Rorty endorses Nietzsche’s realization that 
‘Plato’s “true world” was just a fable”…” (p. 151)  This text of Nietzsche, in Twilight of  the 
Idols, is a classic dissolution of the problem, and is one of Nietzsche’s realist threads.  One 
of the most interesting resolutions of the different threads is the interpretation of this 
section, which unfolds in a series of steps, as Nietzsche describing the changes in his 
own views over time, moving from an early Kantian inspired anti-realism to a later 
realism.10  In another place, they rely on someone else’s take as well: “Vattimo 
applauds Nietzsche’s aphorism, ‘There are no facts, only interpretations’, adding that 
this too is an interpretation.” This sentence is footnoted, and the footnote cites a 
commentator on Vattimo.  The footnote continues “This is of course also Nietzsche’s 
view.  As he writes in Beyond Good and Evil, ‘Granted that this too is an 
                                                          
9 I wish they had devoted a couple of lines to Rorty’s idea of philosophy as “culture criticism”, with its 
attendant view that the centers of gravity in philosophy should shift from epistemology and metaphysics to 
social theory and aesthetics. 
10 John Wilcox, Truth and Value in Nietzsche—A Study of His Metaethics and Epistemology (University of 
Michigan, 1974); Maude-Marie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1991).     . 
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interpretation—and you will be eager enough to raise this objection?—Well, so much 
the better.” (p. 155n)   The quote is in section 22 of BGE.  The aphorism is not found 
there, nor does the text support the claim in the aphorism, which appears not in 
Nietzsche’s published writings but in his notebooks.  More attention to Nietzsche’s texts 
would have helped out Rorty against their criticisms.  They conclude the paragraph by 
noting that this Rortyan/Nietzschean view does not rule out criticism in philosophy 
“any more than in say, music, where different interpretations of a piano sonata, say are 
allowed, while some are judged too sentimental, too lacking in feeling or whatever.” (p. 
155)  Such an interpretation of Nietzsche is not obviously wrong, as art was one of his 
touchstones, and in his early work, he advocates an aesthetic approach to reality.  (In 
his later works, he switches to suggesting—or adds the suggestion—that we substitute 
aesthetic values for moral values.)  But the section in BGE referred to compares 
metaphysical interpretations of physics not to art but to philological interpretations of 
texts.  I think it’s generally thought that textual interpretation faces more constraints 
than musical interpretation.  In addition, philology counted for Nietzsche as 
“Wissenschaft”, or science, so his response to the objection might mean that he is 
appealing to his expertise as a philologist rather than embracing a thoroughgoing anti-
realism.  Once again, forgetting the qualifiers offered regarding the category “science” 
and falling back into the idea that the choice on offer is between physics and poetry 
damages the exposition. 
A lesser objection which should be noted concerns their treatment of Rorty’s 
opposition to system in philosophy.  They take issue with his view of system—but the 
weakness of their criticism is shown because they advocate working systematically, not 
producing or aiming for a system.  Working systematically, i.e., drawing connections 
among different points and tackling questions raised by such questions, need not imply 
any relation to a totality, which having a system does imply.11  This is the only place 
they discuss this very important issue, so it is good that it arises here.  At the very least, 
though their criticism of Rorty looks like a cheap shot.  And, as noted above, given the 
way Nietzsche’s approach to philosophy raises the issues of system and (the different 
point) working systematically, it’s a missed opportunity to delve a bit more deeply into 
the topic. 
                                                          
11 I note that there is a significant difference; Roland Barthes goes even farther and sets forth a diametrical 
opposition between system and the systematic.  Barthes, quoted at length by Jean-Michel Besnier in 
Georges Bataille, politique de l’impossible (Cecile Defaut, 2014), pp. 224-5.  For example, Barthes sees system as 
monological and the systematic as dialogical. 
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B.  “THE DATA OF PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS” 
In this chapter, the authors discuss two types of data for philosophy, phenomenological 
description re phenomenology, and intuitions re conceptual analysis.  These examples 
are well-chosen and of great interest.  However, there are some problems in their 
discussions. 
Their explanation of phenomenology is not bad, especially given the exceptional 
difficulties of trying to provide an explanation to someone without any background.  I 
take issue with their attribution to phenomenology the view that “we do not construct 
representations of the world around us” (pp. 76-7).  This is a plausible but questionable 
interpretation of phenomenology, which places a lot of weight on the idea that we 
“constitute” the world in our intentional acts, and of which most variants are forms of 
transcendental idealism.  At the very least it needs to be said that they are taking a side 
on a matter that is contested within phenomenology.12 
The discussion of intuitions in conceptual analysis has a number of more serious 
issues.  The first of these involves concepts and conceptual analysis entirely apart from 
the question of intuitions.  OGB end this section with a discussion of concepts in which 
concepts and conceptual analysis are presented as entirely apart from and in opposition 
to empirically oriented philosophy.  While it can be practiced this way, and is perhaps 
usually done this way, it should be kept in mind that conceptual analysis is a necessary 
part of empirical inquiry and thus crucial for scientific progress.  Without the correct 
concepts, experiments can be worthless.  Lakatos’s discussion of Prout is the classic case 
in support of this claim.  According to Lakatos, Prout’s hypothesis that the atomic 
weights of the elements were whole-number multiples of hydrogen’s failed to be 
confirmed because chemists lacked the concept of an isotope.  One can add the 
example of physicists fruitlessly trying proofs of the nature of light by showing that it 
did not behave like a wave, or alternatively, that it did not behave like a particle.  
Conceptual analysis then, may have a relation to science, even if when done in an a 
priori fashion and conceived of in terms of intuitions, it becomes unscientific. 
Turning to intuitions, they could be a bit clearer about what is the range and 
weight of intuitions.  As they present it, an intuition gives a conclusive reason for 
thinking that something is true, equivalent to Descartes’s “clear and distinct ideas”.  
The range is the same—drawing a conclusion in a deductive argument is an intuition, 
as well as…well, just about any other claim where “you see that it must be so.” (p. 87)  
                                                          
12 I discuss some aspects of the problems that arise in trying to interpret Husserl’s use of the term 
“constitution” in my paper in this journal, “Derrida, Husserl and the Problem of Prior Sense”.  Cosmos and 
History, 12:1, 2016.  
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They present the view of contemporary intuition skeptics, and I’m glad they do, but if I 
have accurately characterized what intuitions are supposed to be one doesn’t need such 
sophisticated resources.  One could simply point to all of the uncertain or false claims 
that Descartes made, of which he claimed that he had a clear and distinct idea.  
Quine’s treatment of Descartes’s claims of “self-evidence” in The Web of  Belief is clear 
and convincing.13  One should also note that there are problems with combining the 
two types of judgments which they include as intuitions, which seems to serve no 
purpose other than to try to give one’s prejudices or hunches the same weight as the 
drawing of a conclusion to a syllogism.  Descartes includes the same two categories as 
“clear and distinct ideas”, but the purpose is closer to the reverse.  He wants to give the 
same evidential weight to the conclusion as to those immediately known initial 
premises. 
The only case of the use of intuitions that they discuss is Gettier’s article, which 
they claim to be “undeniably of philosophical interest”.  I guess that I’ll have to deny 
the undeniable (maybe I don’t share their intuition on this one);  but I’d be hard-pressed 
to name a philosophical problem of less interest than Gettier’s.  I would say that with 
an appeal to Gettier their concern to keep philosophy from turning into mere navel-
gazing has gone entirely out the window.  They conclude the section on 
phenomenology with a (too quick, in my view) acceptance of the phenomenologist’s 
dismissal of the significance of marginal cases.  Is this consistent with a valorization of 
Gettier? 
The main problem with their argumentation here is that they end up assimilating 
the Socratic elenchus to conceptual analysis involving intuitions, thus presenting the 
intuition skeptic as calling for the abandonment of “the method of traditional 
philosophy”, whose defender is called the “traditionalist”.  (p. 92)  Socratic elenchus can 
be worthwhile even if one accords no evidentiary weight to intuitions, as it shows 
someone that they hold contradictory views.  I don’t see that intuition skepticism 
implies the abandonment of Socratic elenchus. 
Finally, a problem with the chapter is that it calls out for another section on 
empirical and historical examples in philosophy.  They need look no farther than their 
                                                          
13 I take their word that analytic philosophers appeal to intuitions in this way.  My recollection of my 
undergraduate teachers is that their appeal to intuitions was not quite so strong.  I got the sense that 
intuitions (which they constantly appealed to) counted as a reason for a view, but how strong a reason 
wasn’t clear.  It might be just enough to prevent the elimination of a view from consideration, it might 
place the burden of proof on other views, or it might tip the scale for the view, but not before other 
reasons were considered.  But this is my recollection of their (long ago) classroom presentations.  In any 
event, whatever claims are made for intuitions by analytic philosophers, you can class me as one of the 
skeptics. 
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own earlier examples, mentioned above, of the splitting off of sciences from philosophy.  
Additionally, given their interest in science, they could draw on examples in Popper 
(the eclipse predictions), Kuhn, and Lakatos (e.g. Prout).  Or the empirical examples 
Hobbes uses to support his claims, initially derived a priori, of the horrors of a state of 
nature, as well as those used by the critics of Hobbes.  If they want to go even farther 
along these lines, they could briefly mention the Frankfurt School and its empirical 
approach. This discussion would be important for conveying the idea that armchair 
philosophy can also be empirical (if one knows stuff), and, although this is more 
contentious, would perform the valuable service of shifting epistemological 
predilections of philosophers away from logic to history. 
C.  WHAT IS GOOD PHILOSOPHY? 
In this chapter, the authors draw out a number of philosophical virtues from Plato’s 
criticisms of the Sophists.  From examining what Plato claimed was non-philosophy, 
they describe what they take to be the character of good philosophy:  clarity, 
seriousness, rigor, reflectiveness, curiosity, integrity.  This way of proceeding is 
ingenious. 
The discussion of philosophical virtues has many appealing points.  In their 
discussion of philosophical rigor, they make the point that “there is no standard of what 
a philosophical vocabulary should be like independent of a particular philosophical 
position.” (p. 171)  Stated differently, reflective philosophers write as they do because of 
their philosophical views of language. As this statement follows Derrida’s views on 
metaphor, they imply that Derrida writes the way he does because of his philosophical 
views on language—a point that it would have been nice to see made explicitly.  In 
addition, it implies that philosophical views are implicit in all philosophical writing, 
and that no way of writing is philosophically neutral.  “Philosophical reflectiveness 
displays itself in self-consciousness about what methods to adopt.” (p. 180) 
The aspiration to assimilate philosophy to mathematics is discussed under the 
headings of “Philosophical Style” and “Philosophical Rigour”. “Precision is gained only 
at the risk of losing touch with the real life of language…” (p. 170)  (This statement 
obviously resonates with the point with which I begin this review.)  Their responses to 
Timothy Williamson’s  metaphilosophical views are brief, but right on point:  
“…Williamson’s preferred model of the sort of rigour which can be taught is that which 
is exhibited in mathematics, though he does not appear to explain why this should be 
so.”  Lack of justification is compounded by problems of self-refutation.  “He is apt to 
contrast the progress in mathematics which its rigour facilitates with the lack of 
advances supposedly occasioned by its absence: ‘the community of participants has not 
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held itself responsible to high enough methodological standards’, he writes; for 
example, ‘crucial claims are vaguely stated’. It has to be said, unfortunately Williamson’s 
own claim here is not sufficiently explicit to be readily assessable.” (p. 173) 
Under the topic of seriousness, the authors offer what they call “the requirement of 
realism for serious philosophy:  It is the demand that serious philosophical claims be 
grounded in reasons most of us can appreciate…” (pp. 184)  Here they hit on a very 
important aspect of philosophy which is very hard to spell out and justify.  I would 
probably side with the view that this requirement should revolve around reality as it is 
rather than as it is perceived (as they say), but I’m not sure this distinction will be 
ultimately be of great significance in this context. However, I would not mention 
“reality as it is perceived”, which is glossed as consensus, without bringing in the 
hermeneutics of suspicion.  
The authors offer Aristotle’s view that different standards of rigor will apply in 
different fields as a positive reason for avoiding mathematization as the ideal in 
philosophy. This is adequate, but given the importance of the question for 
metaphilosophy, more should be said.  I would suggest that Hume’s view of formal 
systems be considered—that they do not inform one about matters of fact.  This view 
received confirmation—and the Kantian view of mathematics was refuted—by the 
production (or discovery) of non-Euclidean geometries.  Less significant, but directly 
relevant to the concept of rigor, they could mention Lakatos’s (have I mentioned 
Lakatos?) argument in Proofs and Refutations that standards of rigor have changed over 
time in mathematics. This challenges the idea of perfect method in mathematics.14   
I have one objection to their discussion.  I think they seriously underplay the 
importance of originality and profundity in philosophy.  They discuss these very briefly 
in the conclusion, setting them aside as not constitutive of the practice of philosophy.  
This may even be correct, but this view misses something important.  Given the 
extensive consideration they give to science as a standard against which they measure 
philosophy, they should consider the analogy, or connection, of philosophy to science 
in the context of creativity.  If you accept Kuhn’s distinction between normal science 
and revolutionary science, then one can see that originality and profundity are 
constitutive of the latter and not of the former.  How important they are for science 
depends on how important past revolutions are for the science we now have (pretty 
important!), and how happy one is with the current paradigm in any particular science.  
If one thinks of philosophy as pre-paradigm science, then originality and profundity 
                                                          
14 Another article worth a look here is Michael J. Crowe, “Ten Misconceptions About Mathematics and 
Its History,” in History and Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, volume XI, Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, edited by William Asprey and Philip Kitcher (University of Minnesota Press, 1988). 
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would seem to be of even greater significance because one is hoping to achieve 
something greater. 
D.  WHAT GOOD IS PHILOSOPHY? 
This is an important question, and specifying it this way is an excellent idea.  There 
are some good aspects of their discussion—they make a distinction between the 
products of philosophy and the practice of philosophy, and discuss the possible benefits 
of each in turn.  The formulation of the triviality objection by Dennett is provocative: 
“Can anybody outside of academic philosophy be made to care whether you’re right?” 
(p. 191)  Explicitly discussing applied and public philosophy is a good idea.   
However, the absence of some key points undermine their presentation.  They 
quote Posner’s view that philosophy is pointless, but don’t quote or refer to Peter 
Singer’s response.15  They discuss the significance of Hart’s and Dworkin’s 
disagreement on the existence of law, but fail to mention the importance of this issue 
for the Nuremburg trials.  And perhaps Dennett’s objection should be discussed in 
terms of the analytic/Continental divide. 
The two main problems with this chapter are these:  first, they discuss the issue of 
the possible moral improvement of philosophy too narrowly.  They focus on the 
question of whether the study of moral philosophy can, and ought to be expected to, 
result in moral improvement.  This should be broadened to include the possible 
improving effects of political theory, and also the question of whether the possible 
improvements in thinking in general from studying philosophy in general will result in 
moral (and political) improvement.  Is it so ridiculous to hope that philosophy will 
improve one’s thinking in areas other than the specific focus of inquiry? 
Second, they carry out their discussion of the moral implications of seeing 
philosophy as a matter of “world views” in a way which I find extremely distasteful.  
Again the problem is related to their treatment of Nietzsche.  The one mention of 
Nietzsche in this chapter is as follows:  “Philosophers like Nietzsche are often cited in 
this connection, since his distinction between the ‘overman’ and the ‘herd’ was 
employed with terrible consequences by the Nazis.” (p. 203)  This comment builds on, 
and compounds, a problem with the few other mentions of Nietzsche (mentioned 
above), which take Nietzsche as unproblematically espousing a ‘world-view’ or 
‘edifying conversation’ version of philosophy.  While there is a line of thought in 
                                                          
15 Singer, “Ethics beyond Species and beyond Instincts: A Response to Richard Posner,“ in Animal 
Rights—Current Debates and New Directions, edited by Cass Sunstein and Martha Nussbaum (Oxford, 2004), 
pp.78-92. 
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Nietzsche along these lines, there are also realist lines of thought which are just as, and 
probably more prominent.  Of direct relevance for this chapter is the fact that 
Nietzsche abhorred the proto-Nazis and explicitly criticized them.  These criticism are 
not ad hoc, but are based on basic concepts of his thought.  This is certainly relevant 
here. 16  
Not merely is Nietzsche accused via hearsay, but Heidegger, the actual Nazi, is 
given a virtual pass. Heidegger’s ideas are mentioned and discussed frequently 
throughout the book with only one mention of his Nazism—in a footnote in an earlier 
chapter (p. 111n).  One cannot absolve OGB on the grounds that they see no need to 
mention, beyond a footnote, the political implications of a philosopher’s thought.  Each 
of the three times they mention Herder, they are careful to note the negative political 
implications of his thought.   
Nor can this be dismissed as a matter of distinguishing the person from the 
thought.  First, Heidegger stated that his political engagement was a result of his 
thought.  Whether one ultimately accepts this or not, there is a great deal to be said for 
it and it needs to be considered.17  Second, even if one were to make such a distinction, 
omitting this issue omits the most striking example for what many take to be the most 
important metaphilosophical issue—whether one can expect moral and political 
improvements from pursuing philosophy in general.  Certainly Heidegger’s Nazism 
appears to be a striking counterexample, probably the most striking, to such an 
expectation. A book on metaphilosophy should not omit one of the most interesting 
metaphilosophical cases. 
 
*** 
The major arena of metaphilosophical activity in American philosophy for the last 
half century has been the Analytic-Continental divide.  James Conant’s important 
paper in BCL can be fruitfully considered along with OGB’s chapter devoted to this 
topic.18  Both OGB and James Conant (in BCL) start by noting the unhelpfulness of 
                                                          
16 The question of whether Nietzsche bears responsibility, regardless of what he explicitly believed, or the 
use of his thought by the Nazis and others can still be raised, and has been by Derrida.  But his explicit 
views need to be mentioned.   
17 Bourdieu’s discussion of this point seems to me decisive.  Pierre Bourdieu, The Political Ontology of Martin 
Heidegger (Stanford, 1991). 
18 In this chapter, they mention the institutional reality of the divide (p. 107), but don’t treat it at any 
length or in any detail.  They could, at least, have mentioned here the protest of Derrida’s honoring by 
Cambridge, as this would have provided helpful context for that event in the later chapter. 
 RALPH SHAIN 441 
the names.  OGB cite Bernard Williams as calling the names a “cross-classification”, 
and Conant refers to them as “orthogonal”.  This might seem rote enough to need no 
serious consideration, but I mention it because I would like to propose the idea that not 
only are the names “orthogonal”, but so are the referents of the names.  Analytic and 
Continental are orthogonal categories, but not so orthogonal as to be completely 
incomparable.  Given the failure to consider this in the works under review and 
elsewhere, this would seem to be an extremely difficult idea to consider. 
OGB go looking for essences of analytic and Continental philosophy, and their 
consideration and rejection of various possibilities provides the framework for the 
chapter.  This strikes me as somewhat unfortunate; it does allow them to introduce 
some important points, but taking this as an obvious starting point reinforces a 
traditional (and analytic) ahistorical approach at the expense of a more obvious 
historical approach.  Here they would have been better served by introducing the 
discussion with Nietzsche’s dictum, “only that which has no history is definable.”19  
This would have provided a caution to the reader that one is going to have to shift to 
thinking historically rather than analytically, and the additional attention to Nietzsche 
could have helped with the exposition in (at least) two ways.  First, some of Heidegger’s 
criticisms of analytic philosophy they present in this chapter could also come from 
Nietzsche, and second, it might have saved them from a serious problem in their 
Nietzsche references in later chapters (which I have already discussed).  
In addition, they fail to take proper care in making their argument.  They rightly 
say that “Wittgenstein’s remark that a dispute about the precise border between two 
countries doesn’t put the citizenship of all their inhabitants in question seems apposite.” 
(p. 107)  However, borderline cases do need to be resolved or avoided when one is 
citing counterexamples as refuting claims about general categories.  I don’t think they 
avoid using such cases, and Wittgenstein—the Wittgenstein cited here, the later 
Wittgenstein—is the most prominent problem case.  
Nevertheless, they do end up (sort of) in the right place.  After considering possible 
essences in the topics, doctrines, methods, and styles, they conclude that analytic and 
Continental philosophy are traditions.  BCL also characterize analytic and Continental 
as two traditions.  (p. 3)  I would suggest that this is not quite right.  Analytic 
philosophy is a tradition.  Continental philosophy includes multiple traditions.  This is 
the orthogonality of the categories. 
Before considering this, I wish to note the positive aspects of the 
                                                          
19 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil/Genealogy of Morality, translated by Adrian del Caro (Stanford University 
Press, 2014), p. 268. 
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analytic/Continental chapter in OGB, even if the constraints of their framework 
interfere with the insightfulness of their discussion.  One, they discuss the “central role 
of history” in Continental philosophy and the ahistoricality of analytic philosophy.  
This section can be supplemented by Conant’s (BCL 53) and Catarina Dutilh Novaes’s 
very valuable discussions of the ahistoricality and atemporality of analytic philosophy 
(BCL p. 77-78).  Two, they provide examples which others can use to test their theories.  
Three, they devote space to a discussion of clarity, which is of critical importance given 
the frequency with which analytic philosophers have used this as a slur on Continental 
philosophy.  (Especially noteworthy is their lengthy quote from Waismann (p. 125) 
which concludes:  “I’ve always suspected that clarity is the last refuge for those who 
have nothing to say.”)  Four, they mention that Continental is a “term of exclusion”, 
although much more should be said about this.  But at least this points in the direction 
of how insights from social theory about such terms—and the hierarchies they 
reinforce—could be brought to bear on the divide. 
After rejecting the idea that any essence defines analytic or Continental, they 
conclude that one should think of them in terms of traditions.  As noted above, I think 
this is correct.  However, I would propose three corrections or objections.20  
First, analytic philosophy is a tradition, the tradition which takes formal logic as 
the paradigm of knowing.  (By paradigm, I don’t mean anything as sophisticated as 
Kuhn’s use of the term; merely as the “form” of knowing or “preeminent” way of 
knowing.  But I would insist on the vagueness of the term and the multiplicity of ways 
one can devote oneself to the pre-eminence of formal logic.)  Continental philosophy 
includes many traditions, some of which also can be characterized by their paradigm 
of knowing—history of the world (Marx, Nietzsche), history of philosophy (later 
Heidegger), art (early Nietzsche, Lyotard), transcendental logic (Husserl).21  
(Existentialism might be seen as taking some sort of psychology as its paradigm of 
knowing, or as not defined by such a paradigm since its central claim is that the 
answers to life’s important questions cannot be known.)  In characterizing Continental 
philosophy as one tradition, OGB take a too broad view of a philosophy “growing out 
of ” another, so that they claim that “overthrowing” of the basic claims of a tradition is 
a way of staying within the tradition, rather than starting a new one (p. 132).  Finally, I 
would note the obvious point that not all other traditions are included under the term 
Continental.  Pragmatism and later Wittgenstein would be two such non-Analytic 
                                                          
20 Their argument also suffers (again) from their treatment of “science” and the contrast between 
philosophy as science and philosophy as art/literature.   
21 Due consideration needs to be given to the difficulties of talking about recent thinkers in this context.  
Rejecting or standing outside a tradition is not sufficient to start another.   
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traditions. 
Second, OGB recommend three concepts for thinking about traditions:  family 
resemblances, ties of mutual influence, and the fluidity and porousness of borders (pp. 
132-4).  This is very good, but it is not enough.  In trying to interpret traditions one 
needs to consider how certain dead ends are rejected immediately, but others are 
reached over and over again;  which points can be accepted without argument and 
which require hundreds of pages of argument;  which sorts of examples can be used to 
make a point and which cannot;  which positions are safer, and which are more risky;  
which positions can be espoused in early career and which are to be brought out in 
later career (Quine’s and Rorty’s careers are instructive in this regard); which positions 
are rejected on account of serious objections, and which ones remain in consideration 
in spite of serious objections; and which sort of positions achieve the most prestige.22 
Conant’s essay in BCL goes much farther in the necessary direction.  He 
approaches the characterization of analytic philosophy through three perspectives, in 
sequence:  that of practitioners, that of ideologues, and that of historians.  In the third, 
he discusses how one must consider what is entrenched, what participants are deeply 
committed to and deeply invested in, “what goes without saying” in the field; he 
applies the concepts of resistance, fantasy and repression, and he argues for the use of 
the tools of the historian.  There is much that is extremely interesting and important in 
all parts of his account.  A problem remains, in that his treatment of the views of 
practitioners is never corrected to take these ideas into account.   
In the first section he sets forth some “representative quotations” about the nature 
of philosophy by eminent philosophers:  Moore, Russell, Early Wittgenstein, Schlick, 
Carnap, Later Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, Strawson, and Quine.  This is very valuable 
and Conant’s discussion is worthwhile.  However, the stopping point is conspicuous and 
instructive.  No Kripke?  No Lewis?  The return of formal logic to the positions of 
highest eminence should be combined with the disappearance from general discussion 
of some of the thinkers quoted.  As OGB note, after Quine there was “the almost 
complete disappearance of linguistic philosophy from the analytic scene.” (p. 117)   
Richard Eldridge and Tamsin Lorraine confirm this in their essay in BCL, noting that 
                                                          
22 I take it as confirmation of my characterization of analytic philosophy that the positions of 
highest prestige go to logicians.  It might be thought that Davidson and Rawls present 
counterexamples.  I would claim Davidson, not a logician himself, would not have gotten 
anywhere if he hadn’t relied so heavily on Tarski in his early work.  And Rawls “Theory of 
Justice” is not merely ahistorical, but an exercise in decision theory—a branch of mathematics.  
(His admission that history cannot be excluded comes late and without fanfare.  See the 
footnote in Political Liberalism.) 
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what they call the “practice-directed version of conceptual analysis”, naming Austin, 
Wittgenstein, and Ryle “have been largely forgotten or ignored.” (BCL p. 61)23 Since 
Conant doesn’t mention these developments, we are not told how this might affect our 
consideration of the quotes by Austin, Wittgenstein and Ryle.  What does this 
disappearance tell us about the tradition of analytic philosophy? 
The tools that Conant recommends for thinking historically are probably adequate 
for considering these developments, but he doesn’t follow through on his insights and 
apply them to the quotes presented.   He concludes, as do OGB, that analytic 
philosophy is a tradition, and that in a tradition each moment is linked to others in a 
significant way, and in the succession the significance of each moment illuminates the 
others. (p. 55)  This conclusion fails to differentiate adequately according to the depth 
accorded by historical thinking advocated previously—concepts of entrenchment, 
resistance, commitment, fantasy, and so forth.  He takes the work of each of the ten 
philosophers24 quoted to make up “only a single stone in the overall mosaic of the 
analytic tradition.” (p. 27)  A mosaic is flat.  The metaphor aptly captures the lack of 
dimension in this part of his essay. 
Third, the two traditions view, also espoused by BCL, is likely to hinder important 
work which goes beyond analytic philosophy.  OGB recognize this objection, noting 
that engagement across the divide is likely to be between analytics and those 
Continentals who stand in the closest proximity.  Their response to this: “Surely any 
genuine rapprochement between paradigmatically analytic philosophers and 
paradigmatically continental philosophers is just that: a genuine rapprochement.” (p. 
135)  It should be noted that it is themselves that they are defending here—
phenomenology, the Continental tradition with the most in common with Analytic 
philosophy, is the Continental tradition they explore at greatest length. 
On my view there are no “paradigmatically” Continental thinkers in the way there 
are in analytic philosophy because Continental philosophy involves multiple traditions.  
The implication of my view is that work which engages Benjamin and Merleau-Ponty 
(e.g.) would be pluralistic, but it would not count as such on OGB’s and BCL’s “two 
traditions” view. Adopting their view of pluralism as our goal would lead to narrower 
scope of philosophy than we might otherwise have, while leading to undeserved self-
congratulation and a failure to see what is missing. 
 
                                                          
23 I certainly noticed that this had occurred by the time I was in graduate school (late 80s and early 90s) 
with regard to the later Wittgenstein, who of these three was the figure of greatest interest to me.   
24 Conant refers to ten philosophers.  I like the fact that Early Wittgenstein and Later Wittgenstein are 
counted as two philosophers. 
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*** 
When I was in graduate school, “pluralism” was a buzzword.  It had different 
meanings depending on who was advocating it.  When Continentals said it, it meant 
“Give us a seat at the table and we won’t try to wipe you out the way you tried to wipe 
us out,” and there was an undertone directed to other Continental traditions, “Let’s not 
try to wipe each other out the way Analytics tried to wipe us out.”  When Analytics 
said it, “We’ll speed up the process of bringing you in if you don’t try to wipe us out (the 
way we tried to wipe you out).”  And for everyone else, it meant “How about us? Can 
we be included?” 
It was not the only one.  Other buzzwords included capital T “Theory” and the 
“hermeneutics of suspicion.”  These seemed to promise more.  They were both 
pluralistic, but also more concrete than “pluralism”.  Both were interdisciplinary; 
pluralism was not.  Pluralism, nevertheless, did offer some noteworthy benefits over the 
status quo.  First, it carried with it the recognition that analytic philosophy is one 
tradition among others, a point which Conant says is now more widely acknowledged 
(p. 40), but which certainly was not acknowledged then.  Pluralism could mean merely 
having philosophers of different traditions in the same department, but for those who 
were interested in engaging with different traditions, it offered the possibility of adding 
more tools to one’s intellectual toolkit. 
Reading Beyond the Analytic-Continental Divide, subtitled “Pluralist Philosophy in the 
Twenty-First Century”, a collection of essays edited by Jeffrey Bell, Andrew Cutrofello, 
and Paul Livingston, allows one to consider how some philosophers are trying to 
overcome the divide.  What does pluralism mean now? 
Two important cautions before attempting to answer that question.  First, some 
criticisms that apply to the book may not apply to the authors whose papers are 
presented.  I noted above that OGB don’t consider the institutions of philosophy, and 
that same criticism applies to BCL.  However, I know that John McCumber, one of the 
contributors, has done very important work on the institutions of philosophy.25  But 
there is no institution-critique in his paper here.  It is only this book that is under 
consideration, and the vision of pluralism presented is that of the editors.  That vision 
may or may not be shared by the other contributors. 
The second caution is that nearly all of the contributors are well established 
philosophers with long publication histories.  I would expect that my objections and 
                                                          
25 Time in the Ditch (Northwestern University Press, 2001); The Philosophy Scare (University of Chicago Press, 
2016). 
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questions are addressed in their other published works.  However, I have only this book 
in front of me;  those who think a project sounds promising or intriguing are directed 
to the contributor’s other writings. 
The editors provide a brief but very helpful introduction.  Their philosophical view 
is one of “synthetic philosophy”, which narrows down the way in which they envision 
getting “beyond” the divide.  They construe “philosophy as a cosmopolitan 
endeavor…  To this end, each of the essays draws centrally on problems, methods, and 
results of both traditions to produce new work across a variety of areas.” (p. 2)  They 
then discuss the essays under five headings—very roughly, language, realism and anti-, 
metaphysics, time, and practice. 
I have already noted two ways in which this view is less cosmopolitan than one 
might hope—it’s not interdisciplinary, and is likely to constrict the work done in 
Continental philosophy to that which is of greatest proximity to analytic philosophy.  
BCL’s anthology shows that these fears are justified.  In the remainder of the review, I 
will discuss the essays under five headings, pointing out where these overlap with those 
of the editors. 
a.  “Time is the true hero of every feast.” (Bakhtin) 
The editors stress a difference between the atemporal and ahistorical aspects of 
analytic philosophy and the tendency of much Continental philosophy to see time and 
history as of great importance, and I have already mentioned that Conant and Novaes 
do so as well in their essays.  I do not follow Wittgenstein in thinking that philosophical 
problems about time are pseudo-problems, and consider these legitimate and 
important problems, metaphysics with a small ‘m’. The essays which focus on time and 
history are the most interesting in the book. 
I have already discussed Conant’s paper; Catarina Dutilh Novaes’s essay, 
“Conceptual Genealogy for Analytic Philosophy” also falls under this heading.  She 
begins by discussing (as already mentioned) analytic philosophy’s ahistorical view of 
philosophy.  She then sketches her project, which is to use ideas from Nietzschean 
genealogy in investigating the history of analytic philosophy.  Her references to 
Canguilhem and the History and Philosophy of Science movement are welcome.26  
Her discussion of Foucault’s archaeology and genealogy, which stresses the differences 
and argues for the preferability of genealogy over archaeology, can be usefully 
                                                          
26 HPS was a major event at the time of its founding and resulted from a recognition of the need for the 
alteration of standard conceptions of science.  Has it retained its influence?   
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compared with Lee Braver’s account in his contribution (discussed below).27  She 
proposes a “neutral” genealogy, one that fulfills “a purely explanatory function”. (p. 97)  
Her genealogy traces concepts and finds assumptions which are embedded in concepts 
which are in current use in analytic philosophy.  
By pointing out unnoticed assumptions, Novaes’s method makes history more 
philosophical and gives it a critical edge.  This edge may not be as critical as full-
fledged genealogy, but there is no problem as long as one doesn’t see this as a 
replacement for a genealogy motivated by a philosophy of suspicion (and Novaes never 
claims that it should be seen as such).  By steering the finding of assumptions to an 
historical inquiry, Novaes project helps to provide safeguards to the imputing of 
assumptions, which can be a way of imputing errors which haven’t been made.  Her 
project has the promise to get philosophers to see their work historically, thus making 
philosophy more historical, which would be a major accomplishment. 
Andrew Cutrofello’s essay, “Revolutionary Actions and Events” is helpful in many 
ways.  He begins by contrasting the standard analytic view of events (ordinary) with a 
view of events held by a number of prominent Continentals (extraordinary).  Among 
the latter, he treats Badiou and Arendt, examining Arendt’s views of revolutionary 
actions and Badiou’s of revolutionary Events.  The dialogue he sets up between them is 
very interesting, and the Arendtian response he provides to Badiou’s critique of her 
theory is very valuable.  He then skilfully uses the debate between the analytic A-series 
and B-series theories of time (which arise out of McTaggart’s discussion of time) to 
elucidate these theories, and the theories in return elucidate the A-series/B-series 
debate.  In interpreting Arendt’s view as one where, without thinking subjects, time 
would have a B-series structure (p. 298), I think he has hit on the best possible view of 
time that transcendental philosophers can hope for. 
There are a few points where I would contest or question his claims.  He says that 
Arendt is “a resolute A series theorist”, but this would be only true relative to her view 
                                                          
27 There are a couple of points of interpretation where I disagree.  However, these don’t affect her main 
points.  The main one would be her designating Nietzschean genealogy as finding shameful origins, which 
she corrects to finding origins inconsistent with the practitioners self-conception.  I interpret Nietzsche’s 
genealogy as including the latter as well as the former, as most of the points he finds in his Genealogy of 
Morals conflict with Christians’ self-conception but are not flaws in his view (e.g., Christianity as an 
exercise in will to power, which is inevitable according to Nietzsche).  In addition, finding a shameful 
origin, if shameful means shameful according to standard ways of thinking, is not a negative in Nietzsche’s 
book.  He does, of course use genealogy to find material for his external criticism—Christianity is reactive.  
This part would fit in Novaes view, but since Nietzsche does not commit the genetic fallacy—a point left 
up in the air by Novaes—this is only of concern because Christianity (and its successors) are still 
reactive—still nihilistic, still vengeful, and no longer have compensating active functions in society. 
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of revolutionary actions;  a truly resolute A series theorist would apply the designations 
of past, present and future to all actions, and indeed all moments, ordinary as well as 
extraordinary.  Also, his account of the open future version of the A-series is highly 
questionable.  According to Cutrofello, the A-series view “precludes the possibility of 
revolutionary events.  Even if it isn’t determined now whether or not a sea battle will 
occur tomorrow, its eventual occurring won’t involve a radical transformation of the 
existing ontological order.  In Lewis’s terminology, it won’t involve a hitherto alien 
property, a property not previously present in the world.” (p. 100)  Of course the A-
series/open future describes the appearance of anything new—thing or event—as the 
occurrence of something “not previously present in the world”  and as a 
“transformation of the existing ontological order” if one wants to use this grandiose 
description.  If that’s what’s needed for a radical change, then every ordinary event and 
action is a radical change—and looks pretty radical compared to Plato’s metaphysics.  
It may not be radical enough for Kantian views, such as Arendt’s and Badiou’s (and 
Cutrofello has an important footnote comparing Badiou with Kant (p. 301 n.5)), but 
Cutrofello doesn’t discuss the ways Kant’s project was a reactive attempt to put the 
brakes on the French and Scottish Enlightenments; nor does he discuss the ways in 
which Badiou’s view of an Event (which Cutrofello presents accurately as beyond 
objective proof or refutation for Badiou) is a reactive attempt to save his past failed 
political and religious commitments.  Finally, I find it worrisome when Cutrofello 
brings in Lewis’s Possible Worlds view, as this may indicate that he is heading for an 
atemporal view himself.  But that is only hinted at in this paper, and does not detract 
from the points mentioned above. 
John McCumber’s paper is the most ambitious in the book.  As indicated by the 
title of his paper, “Why is Time Different from Space?”, he not only dives directly into 
the basic question in the philosophy of time—How does time differ from space?—he 
also attempts to show that this new question “Why?” is legitimate and to provide the 
answer.  His discussion treats together the phenomenological and empiricist take on 
experience.  This would be very important if successful.  I don’t think it is, and will 
pose a few objections. 
There are two parts of his paper which I think are of special note.  First, he opens 
by rejecting the typical claims (typical of Analytics) that the beyond of the 
analytic/Continental divide lies in an Aufhebung, specifically bringing analytic clarity to 
the important issues addressed by Continentals.  Instead, he suggests that going beyond 
the divide should be “neither-nor” rather than “both-and”.  I definitely concur.  In 
addition, McCumber sets out a theory of “nearings” and “farings”, which along with 
the concept of “scripts”, will be the basis of his theory of time.  Rocks, animals, and 
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people are all involved in multiple ways (e.g. walking toward, thinking of, imitating, 
attaining a closer position in a hierarchy are all “nearings”) in nearings and farings, 
and the extensive discussion shows that none of the meanings of these terms is primary, 
as a reductive physical view is going to claim.  All of these meanings are legitimate. 
Objections:  
(1) McCumber begins by mentioning our empirical experience of time and 
often juxtaposes empirical with phenomenological.  But these sit together uneasily, and 
ultimately the phenomenological wins out over the empirical.  He calls his approach a 
“humbler” version of phenomenology.  McCumber spends much of his essay looking 
for a phenomenological experience which will be the basis of space and time.   He is 
trying to do so in a way which takes Edward Casey’s work as a starting point, but tries 
to correct Casey’s mistakes, as Casey in turn was trying to correct Merleau-Ponty, who 
was trying to correct Heidegger, who was trying to correct Husserl.  (Rich tradition or 
degenerating problemshift?)  Although it is beyond the scope of this review to establish 
this objection, it seems to me that McCumber’s approach is not neither/nor enough.28 
 (2) One of the errors of these precursors that McCumber addresses is that they 
fail to “explain how non-human entities are in time”. (p. 216)  He then goes on to note 
that the “crucial move in this is to see that nearing and faring need not be with respect 
to us; they can be motions of non-human, and indeed non-sentient bodies.” (p. 216)  I 
don’t think this is enough to claim an advantage for his view.  As I read McCumber’s 
paper, nearings and farings are not enough for time.  Time arises only with a “script”, 
and he never addresses the issue of whether non-human animals have scripts. 
This latter idea points to the possible significance of McCumber’s paper.  I would 
consider his theory successful, not if it provides better ad hoc adjustments to the work 
of a long series of precursors making ad hoc adjustments to what was a pretty bad 
theory to begin with.  The question is whether the theory is fruitful in adding to our 
empirical knowledge of the world.  Does his concept of “scripts” lead to fruitful 
questions in the investigation of animal minds?  Do the concepts of “nearings” and 
“farings” add anything to our knowledge of social hierarchies or of art? (I mention the 
latter because they are reminiscent of Benjamin’s concept of aura.)  It seems quite 
                                                          
28 A key point is that the originary experience he looks for and finds, where time and space are 
“indifferent” is where travelling is measured not in spatial units, but in temporal units.  (Think trekking.)  
While one should grant that this way of experiencing space is just as legitimate as more abstract 
measurement, there is no reason to take it as primary (other than the demand by phenomenology for an 
“originary” experience).  Furthermore, I would suggest the B-series as a view in which time and space are 
indistinct.  The B-series is a spatial figure, and a lot of people have been convinced that it is the structure 
of time.  Related sorts of experiences, where time and space are ‘indifferent’, would be reading a diary 
and looking at a calendar. 
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possible. But McCumber’s metaphilosophical views—helpfully laid out in an 
appendix—show a sharp distinction between philosophy and science of the sort too 
often at work in OGB, and which I think creates a barrier to empirical investigation. 
Although it may not fit as obviously, I will treat Jeffrey Bell’s essay under this 
category.  Bell lays out the ontological view known as “truthmaker philosophy” and 
argues that Deleuze’s metaphysics of difference would meet its needs and deal with the 
objections to that theory better than its proponents have.  I think he does an 
exceptionally good job of explaining truthmaker theory and laying out the various 
objections it has faced and its attempts to respond to those objections.  That Deleuze’s 
dynamic, open-ended theory (“There is no final determinate point upon which all of 
our truths will settle.” (p. 146)) handles in a superior manner objections to a static, 
atemporal theory should not come as a surprise.  Bell, though, does not address the 
concern which prevented me from getting far in my attempt to read Difference and 
Repetition.  The book—or at least as far as I got—is an unremitting barrage of a priori 
claims.  Of course, the truthmakers are unlikely to push this objection. 
b.  Return of Capital M Metaphysics. 
As mentioned above, pluralism suggests the promise of having more tools in one’s 
intellectual toolkit to solve and dissolve problems.  Some of the essays in this book 
remind us that it also provides more tools for avoiding problems and indulging in 
pseudo-solutions.  (I don’t think it’s a coincidence that it’s the essays which strive to 
provide atemporal metaphysical views are the worst offenders.)  The editors note in 
their introduction that, after a great deal of activity in the twentieth century generating 
critiques of metaphysics, “Recent years, however, have witnessed a variety of “returns” 
of metaphysical theorizing for both analytic and Continental thinkers.” (p. 8)  They 
class this under the heading of “Critique of the Critique”.  They supply plenty of 
evidence that these returns have taken place, but that subtitle makes a promise that 
they do not make good on.  Nowhere in the introduction, nor (with one exception, a 
footnote in Paul Livingston’s paper, discussed below) in any of the essays are the anti-
metaphysical critiques directly addressed and no objections are provided.  Instead 
these critiques are ignored, and one is left wondering why the editors want to further 
this trend. 
David Woodruff Smith wishes to add Husserl’s model of intentionality to Tarski’s 
model of truth.  This will allow us to talk of an “experience of truth.”  I can see why 
each sort of theory would appeal to a devotee of the other, as they both privilege 
formal systems (formal logic for Tarski, mathematics for Husserl) as ways of knowing.  
However, instead of solving the problems of each, the conjunction saddles each with 
the problems of the other. 
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First Tarski:  A theory of truth for formal logic is taken as the theory of truth for 
matters of fact.  This requires the concepts of truth conditions and possible worlds 
(substituting for Tarski’s models).  All of this so that we can have tautologies for truth 
conditions in an attempt to avoid objections to the earlier view of truth conditions 
developed for logical atomism.  This is thought to be safe from objection because of the 
tautologous nature of the truth conditions.  Of course it might be thought to be the 
epitome of metaphysics, not merely because of the need for models or possible worlds, 
but because it only works if one neutralizes time—the ‘is’ has to be tenseless—and 
requires univocity, as there’s no guarantee that the terms will match reality if they are 
vague or ambiguous.  (Rules of well-formed sentences will have to be provided as well.)  
Either way you look at it, it drains all of the meaning of the term “truth conditions”, as 
they no longer provide any assistance in determining the truth of a statement.  It gives 
us a lot of metaphysical machinery only to leave us with the same practices—here, 
practices of justification—that we use anyway.  This is the way Metaphysics typically 
works. 
Now Husserl: Smith explains Husserl’s concept of intentionality by equating 
Husserl’s “Noema” with Frege’s “Sinn”.29  What is noteworthy is what is left out in this 
account of Husserl.  No mention of “originary experiences”.  No “constitution” or 
“production” of objects.  No mention of the transcendental.  This is not all that’s 
omitted.  He explains Husserl’s epoche as a case of semantic ascent.  However, the 
question is what happens during the descent?  Husserl promised solutions to 
foundational problems in philosophy, including the problem of the external world.  All 
we get from Smith’s account is that “we appreciate the role of meaning in our 
experience”.  In other words, with Tarski we take the quotations off of a statement, and 
with Husserl we put the quotations back on.  But now we appreciate the statement more.   
One thing Smith has picked up from Husserl is the capacity to seem to make an 
important claim but qualify it out of existence, or discuss a claim as to be proven but 
never quite get around to proving it.  This is repeated endlessly in his discussion of the 
“experience of truth.”  Is this an experience of truth or of seeming-truth?  Smith is 
clear that these differ:  “truth does not reduce to the phenomenological character of 
seeming-veracity.” (p. 120).  But every time he says he experiences truth, he both says 
that he experiences the veridicality (or veracity) of the statement, but then includes the 
qualifier “from my first-person perspective”. (p. 119, 121)  “Veridicality” and “veracity” 
mean truth, but Smith says that he “may be wrong” (p. 119), and he equates them with 
                                                          
29 I believe this goes back at least to Dagfinn Føllesdal.  See his paper “Husserl’s Concept of Noema”. 
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“truthiness”, which as he notes “does not itself guarantee truth”.30   
Paul Livingston brings together Wittgenstein and Heidegger in his paper 
“Wittgenstein Reads Heidegger, Heidegger Reads Wittgenstein.”  The Wittgenstein 
here is the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus.  Livingston is interested in the “still 
obscure linkages among being, language, and truth.” (p. 222)  He is interested in “…the 
possibility of a level of appearance or manifestation, beyond all facts and beings, that 
gives rise to the very sense with which all facts and worldly beings are endowed.” (p. 
235)  He is interested in “foundational problems about logic, sense, and meaning, and 
the totality of the world…” (p. 237)  Instead of talking about languages, he wants to talk 
about language as such (p. 227);  instead of forms of life, he turns to Agamben’s concept 
of “’form-of-life’ as an essentially unitary concept.” (p. 246 n. 63)  Foundations, unity, 
totality, essence (‘as such’), the transcendental.  To the Wittgensteinian, this sounds like 
nonsense. 
In the paragraph Livingston devotes to the Philosophical Investigations, he signals that 
he interprets the book in a way which sharply diminishes its critical edge.  On his view, 
the book “displaces the theoretical tendencies to assume in advance…” I would reply, 
“not just in advance”.  And Wittgenstein was not just “displacing” the theoretical 
tendencies, he was trying to eradicate them.  Livingston’s response to the dismissal of 
his questions is confined to a footnote addressing Rorty, and is hardly persuasive 
against the great weight of argumentation concerning the kinds of nonsense 
philosophers talk. 
Graham Priest proposes that the answer to Heidegger’s question of Being can be 
found in “paraconsistent logic”. His paper is an example of analytic reading of 
Continental philosophy, and I would say that it falls outside the category of pluralism.  
Only someone who took formal logic as the paradigm of knowing would think that 
formalizing a part of discourse which escaped (or refuted) the previous logics would 
answer or solve a philosophical question. History plays no role in his approach to 
Heidegger’s question of Being.31 
Priest begins with an a priori claim: “Take an object with parts.  What makes them 
into a single thing:  There must be something in virtue of which they form a unity.  
Quite possibly, this thing depends on the unity in question. …But whatever this 
binding agent is, there must be one.” (p. 252) Why must there be?  Why must it be one?  
                                                          
30 “Veracity” has multiple meanings, one of which provides a bit of wiggle room, but there is none for 
“veridicality”. 
31 For my take on Heidegger and Being, see “Language and Later Heidegger:  “What is 
Being?” Philosophical Forum, 40:4, 2009, 489-499. 
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Priest should apply this thinking to traditions and philosophical problems.  What makes 
Heidegger’s “question of Being” one?  
The philosophical work is all done in the application of the formal system.  
Consider now the part of the quote just above which I skipped:  “If the unity is a 
house, its parts are bricks, and maybe what makes them into a unity is their geometric 
configuration.  If the unity is a symphony, its parts are notes, and maybe what makes 
them into a unity is their arrangement.” (p. 252) The “maybes” show that the 
interesting questions are pushed into the application.  The same is going to be the case 
in applying the special paraconsistent variable.  The decision to specify which kinds of 
things permitted to entail contradictions will have to be made outside of the logic; if 
anything can entail a contradiction, then you’ve ruled out logic altogether. 
Since he avoids taking a position (“maybe”), there’s no use exploring 
counterexamples.  There is also another reason to avoid counterexamples—they will 
be ruled out by the apparatus.  Regarding plural objects, indicated by plural forms of 
reference (“Russell and Whitehead”), Priest says:  “The reply is simple, however, The 
machinery does not allow us to refer to objects that are plural, but to a plurality of 
objects.  If something is, it is one, a unity; and if some things are, they are ones, unities.  
The machinery of plural reference does indeed enable one to refer to a plurality of 
objects, but each is one.  So to be is still to be one.” (p. 255)  The machinery decides 
what the characteristics of objects are (“middle-sized dry goods” as Austin quipped).  
This recalls Quine’s “To be is to be the object of a bound variable.” Ontology is 
dictated by formal logic. 
c.  Anti-Realism is Rife 
Anti-realism is prominent throughout.  It is not clear whether there are more anti-
realists than realists, but anti-realism has a more prominent profile.  The two essays in 
which the realism-antirealism dispute is the focus, by Lee Braver and Carol Rovane, 
both argue for anti-realism.  In addition, the realists (like McCumber) or those who 
don’t say in their essay, tend to come out of or rely heavily on the Kantian and 
phenomenological traditions so there is an anti-realist drag on their work.  I take this to 
be a highly problematic view for reasons of social justice, and Braver and Rovane both 
take up ethico-political concerns in their essays. So this might be a good opportunity 
for addressing these issues. 
Braver argues that Foucault’s anti-realism is superior to Putnam’s anti-realism (this 
argument includes an argument that Putnam’s internal realism is actually anti-realism).  
Braver is also arguing for anti-realism and I will spend more time on this aspect of the 
essay. His Foucault is primarily the Foucault of the archaeology, but also bringing in 
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the Foucault of the genealogical period and interpreting this period in such a way as to 
make it (quite plausibly) consistent with the epistemological claims of the earlier period. 
In short, we have the historical aprioris (of different epochs) and power.  Braver argues 
that Putnam falls back on a timeless/ahistorical view of truth, but that Foucault has 
achieved a truly temporal/historical, hence non-Metaphysical, view. 
The first point to be made is that Braver’s presentation of Foucault undercuts his 
arguments against realism.  Braver says that “…Foucault draws the conclusion that 
whatever affects the formation of these concepts and justificatory practices plays a role 
in determining reality and truth, and so has a rightful place in determining reality and 
truth, and so has a rightful place in ontology and epistemology.  In particular, what he 
calls power influences the formation of concepts…” (p. 158)  Also “Without a 
transcendental safe house, power partially determines concepts…” (p. 160)  If power 
partially determines concepts, then the realist could say, let’s focus on the other 
determining factors.  And if they are partially determined by power, let’s consider 
whether that part could be more or less.  If power influences the formation of concepts, 
influences could be more or less, and let’s consider cases where there’s less influence, as 
well as the other influences.  The realist might have to reconsider their account, 
changing from all-or-nothing to more-or-less, but the realist can grant everything 
Braver says of Foucault’s views (leaving aside the question of its interpretive accuracy), 
and still maintain realism. 
The second point, and more significant for Braver’s account, is that although he 
accurately shows how Putnam’s account falls back into Metaphysics, I believe that his 
does as well.  Putnam does so, as Braver points out, when he appeals to an idealized 
future under ideal epistemological conditions. (p. 160) But examining Braver’s response 
to Putnam shows that his view ties truth too closely to the present, and this privileging 
of presence (to use the Derridean locution), is also atemporal. Both his view and 
Putnam’s view close off the connection of the present to the future; they merely do so in 
different ways. 
Consider the following three claims Braver makes in response to Putnam 
(emphases mine in all three):  (1) “If this ideal state cannot have any effect on, and 
possess no knowable relationship to, how we know things here and now, then the same 
pragmatic intuitions that lead Putnam to reject noumena should also eliminate these.” 
(p. 160)  (2) An important footnote to a later point asks this rhetorical question: “Rorty 
is right to point out the ‘cautionary’ use of truth in the sense that we might later come 
to reject what we now hold to be true, but what is gained by saying “p is justified but not 
true because it might later turn out to be false” instead of “p is now true but might later 
be false?”” (p. 168 n. 69) (3) Instead of looking for ideal conditions, Foucault studies the 
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de facto historical justificatory practices that have actually occurred, believing that truth 
cannot be located anywhere else than within actual knowledges or scientific practices.” 
(p. 161) 
Here a bit of suspicion directed at the Kantian origins of Foucault’s anti-realism is 
useful. Kant rejected noumena in order to reverse the Copernican turn—to put human 
beings back at the center of the universe. Bringing history to bear on Kant’s account of 
categories and constitution of objects is not necessarily going to escape this problem. 
Braver’s account sticks with the “here and now” with no connection to the future; truth 
is located “within” current practices, again cutting off a connection to the future.   
Let us consider Braver’s rhetorical question about what is gained. I am going to try 
to answer a related question—not exactly the same but close enough and sharing the 
important focus on “what is gained”. Let us examine our practice of talking about 
mistakes, initially within the context of an umpire’s or referee’s call in a game. Suppose 
someone asserts after the entire season is over, that a crucial call was blown. The 
response might be, “What is to be gained by saying the call was wrong?”  The game, 
and season is over, and the call decided the game (and season). In one sense, the call 
was “true”—the player was out (or whatever)—owing to the performative aspect of the 
call. In another sense, though, it makes perfectly good sense to say that the player was 
safe—he or she got to the base before the throw, or the tag was late. What is gained 
though in thinking in the latter way?  Maybe a sense of grievance.32  Rather than 
argue that a grievance is a gain, I would reply—maybe nothing is gained. There are 
pointless truths. That is one of the sadder aspects of life. Ruling them out because they 
are pointless is also Metaphysical. 
One can see that this leads right into the ethico-political objection to anti-realism. 
Identifying injustice requires a realistic account. This objection is most forcefully 
expressed by MacKinnon: 
Take the problem of “is there a reality and how do I know I’m right about it?”  
The “is there a there there?” business. How do we deal in the face of Cartesian—
updated as existential—doubt?  Women know the world is out there because it 
hits us in the face. Literally. We are raped, battered, pornographed, defined by 
force, by a world that begins, at least, entirely outside us. No matter what we 
think about it, how we try to think it out of existence on into a different shape or 
us to inhabit, the world remains real. Try some time. It exists independently of 
our will. […]Cartesian doubt—this anxiety about whether the world is really 
                                                          
32 One would like to see a sense of humility gained. Braver is right that humility seemed to be in short 
supply among mental health professionals through the period in question.  I agree that this is a major 
problem. 
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there independent of our will or our representations, if I can doubt it, maybe it 
doesn’t exist—comes from the luxury of a position of power that entails the 
possibility of making the world as one thinks or wants it to be. Which is exactly 
the male standpoint.33 
Now consider the case of mistake in a criminal conviction. Was a gun fired in self-
defense or not?  Was the contraband planted by the police or not?  If the gun was fired 
in self-defense, or the contraband was planted by the police—what good is it to claim 
after a conviction that the court’s judgment was in error?  (If the Foucaultian objects 
that these are falsehoods under the existing set of practices, one can change the 
example to considering investigatory practices for whether fires have been set, or the 
believability of eyewitnesses.)  This is going to depend on how soon it can be 
established. If established before the sentence is completed, and while the one falsely 
convicted, is still alive, it can secure a release and some compensatory payment. That is 
not nothing. If it is established too late, then the answer may be that it’s too late, 
nothing is gained. It doesn’t make it any less true merely because it is pointless. 
Foucault’s view, like pragmatism, ties truth too closely to current practices. 
Braver’s responds to the ethico-political objection to anti-realism by arguing that 
realism leads to injustice, and the anti-realist view will have salutary effects. Expertise, 
according to Braver, depends on a realist view, and claims of expertise result in 
oppression and unjust suffering: “And the actions committed by claims of expertise, 
according to Foucault, are a form of oppression and enforced conformity. In general, 
the power that experts like psychologists wield in our society is underwritten by our 
faith in their knowledge of a realist self.” (p. 163)  Braver believes that anti-realism will 
undermine faith in the authorities because their views “lack a neutral means of 
adjudication” (p. 164). This may happen, but it certainly doesn’t follow as a matter of 
logical implication. Given that (according to Braver) truth is only internal to actual 
practices, expert knowledge becomes true by definition. The expert is the one who 
knows and follows the current practices, and truth is only to be found within those 
practices.  
The question of whether an anti-realist view will lead to more caution and humility 
with regard to judgments or less is a factual question. It may be that it would have no 
effect, because various other motivations (power? self-interest?) have a greater effect on 
people’s actions than their conception of reality. The point I wish to make is that I don’t 
think an anti-realist can make such a vast, difficult, empirical claim without making 
some concession to realism. 
                                                          
33 MacKinnon, “Desire and Power,” in Feminism Unmodified (Harvard University Press, 1987), pp. 57-8.   
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 Braver cites Wittgenstein in support of his anti-realism: “Wittgenstein agrees that 
heterogeneous language-games cannot be resolved rationally, since rationality exists 
only within particular language-games.” (p. 165)  Because I have leaned so heavily on 
Wittgenstein in this review, a reply is necessary. 
All of Braver’s citations are to On Certainty, which I think it is best to avoid. My 
Wittgenstein, the Wittgenstein that I have appealed to in this essay, includes the Blue 
Book and the Investigations. There are a number of reasons to support the view that the 
latter have the best claim to presenting “Wittgenstein’s” work. First, Wittgenstein took 
particular care with what he put into the Investigations. This was the work he considered 
his most important and most finished. He let his literary executors know that he 
wanted them to publish the Investigations, but left it to their discretion to publish 
anything else from his writings. Similarly, the Blue Book was dictated to students and 
thus deliberately distributed to others. I would suggest that these considerations 
indicate that my “Wittgenstein” has some claim to be closer to Wittgenstein’s most 
considered self-conception than other versions. Second, Wittgenstein had plenty of 
ideas of which he had not decided how or whether they fit in with the ideas of the 
Investigations. These ideas include holdovers from his earlier phase, such as his belief in 
the ineffability of ethics, which appear to be in direct conflict with the Investigations, as 
well as new ideas that he took up during and after the writing of the Investigations. The 
separateness of these latter is shown by the fact that he started new notebooks or card 
files rather than simply inserting these thoughts into the Investigations. It seems 
appropriate to consider the relation of Wittgenstein’s ideas in his notebooks or card files 
to the Investigations as unsettled without careful consideration.  
These considerations hold especially for On Certainty. Although there are many 
connections between the two—and the point seized upon by Braver and other 
relativists—that justification comes to an end somewhere—also appears in the 
Investigations (with no anti-realist implications there), the ideas in On Certainty are far 
more tentative than the Investigations. Different lines of thought are presented in On 
Certainty, generally addressing each of Moore’s specific examples, but they never 
converge on one particular correct view. Whereas the interlocutor in the Investigations 
presents views which are rejected, and the openness comes from extending the ideas 
into new areas or presenting new perspectives, in On Certainty there is genuine openness 
as to which of the lines of thought are correct and how they might fit together. Very 
grave doubts are expressed throughout, including towards the relativist view (e.g., 
section 358). 
In addition to these interpretive matters, there are important philosophical 
considerations which suggest that Wittgenstein erred in giving as much consideration to 
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relativism in On Certainty as he does. I noted earlier that I don’t think that philosophical 
problems dealing with time are pseudo-problems as Wittgenstein did. With the issue of 
time in mind, let us consider the passage quoted by Braver, “At the end of reasons 
comes persuasion.” (p. 165)  Well, tomorrow could one find more reasons than one has 
today?  Wittgenstein’s basic approach has been described by Marjorie Grene as putting 
language “back in the context of movement” against the “immobilizing influence of 
philosophy.”34 Wittgenstein himself described his method in this way in his notebooks 
and lectures, even though he did not include this view in his “official” philosophy.35  
This line of thought concerning changes in circumstances and how they alter 
considerations of doubt and justification appears repeatedly in On Certainty (sections 96-
99, 134, 256, 420-1, 492), where they pose a sharp challenge to the relativist view.36  
Braver’s position, and the passage he relies on, does the reverse— they immobilize 
rather than placing in time. I would take the metaphilosophical self-description and 
strategy Wittgenstein repeatedly considered for his major work but did not ultimately 
adopt as one that is philosophically superior to any that would allow for the 
reinforcement of the “immobilizing influence of philosophy”.37 
Rovane’s essay is also a consideration of and argument for anti-realism. Her main 
concern is with the main participants in the analytic debates and their anxiety that 
with relativism, “anything goes”. She also aims to explore “the moral sources of 
resistance to relativism”, mentioning Habermas, Hegel, Marx, and Honneth, although 
only the last of these is substantively addressed. Some of what I say about Braver’s 
paper will apply to Rovane’s as well.  
Rovane’s contribution to analytic moral epistemology is to argue that it should talk 
directly about universalism and bracket issues about realism and objectivity. I agree, 
but don’t think that this will provide any reason for thinking that this will support a 
                                                          
34 Grene, “Life, Death and Language: Some Thoughts on Wittgenstein and Derrida”, in Philosophy in 
and out of Europe (University of California Press, 1976), p. 150.   
35 For Wittgenstein’s self-description along these lines, see Philosophical Remarks (University of Chicago 
Press, 1975), pp. 59, 80-81; Philosophical Grammar (University of California Press, 1974), p. 55; Lectures 
on the Foundations of Mathematics (University of Chicago Press, 1976), 182. He didn’t follow through on 
this line of thought, perhaps because he didn’t want to legitimate philosophical questions about time. 
36 Section 96: “It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were 
hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and 
that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid.” 
Section 256:  “On the other hand, a language-game does change with time.”  
37 A more complicated substantive issue which is relevant to a reading of On Certainty (and is closely related 
to the issue of whether all philosophical problems can be dissolved) concerns Wittgenstein’s view that 
there is a sharp separation of philosophical questions and scientific/empirical questions.  I don’t follow 
Wittgenstein on this point, but will leave this issue aside. 
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“multi-mundialism”, as she refers to her version of relativism. 
Her multi-mundialism is based on the concepts of “alternativeness”, “epistemic 
indifference”, and “normative insularity”. The key points in her argument turn on 
pragmatic concepts:  (1) whether different views can be alternatives for specific people, 
that is, whether there is a genuine possibility that they could adopt a different action or 
practice; (2) the question of whether there is a normative point to claiming that there is 
a disagreement. According to Rovane, these concepts allow for some measure of 
objectivity in moral decisions without universality. “What would be correct is for them 
to live in the best way that is actually feasible, given the actual options they face, and given 
the best guidance they may draw from the thick moral values that speak specifically to 
those options.” (emphases in original; p. 280) The example she mentions as a culture 
which should be (is?) insulated from normative criticism is a culture in which honor 
and modesty are thick concepts.   
The pragmatic concepts are worth investigating. The concept of genuine possibility 
is an important one. Looking at particular historical circumstances is important and 
would be welcome.38  In addition, one sometimes has the sense that some moral 
criticism of past or other cultures is empty point-scoring, or worse, smug avoidance or 
contemporary moral failings of one’s own. Rovane’s approach, though, undermines any 
positive impetus these ideas might have. Rovane issues a call to examine concrete 
historical circumstances, but she doesn’t mention a single one for a single example. She 
inveighs against thin concepts and attempts to counter abstractions with further 
abstractions and the thinnest of concepts—“world”. And Rovane fails to explain why 
her concepts not only shield the colonized and the conquered from normative critique, 
but also shield the colonizers and the conquerors.39   
With regard to the question of the normative point of criticism, she limits her 
discussion to a normative demand she finds in Continental philosophers (Marx, 
Habermas, Honneth) to overcome alienation from others. She doesn’t discuss 
                                                          
38 One thinks here of work by Loretta Kopelman and Ruth Benedict.  Both of these would seem to be 
touchstones for any approach which treats moral values as attempts to solve problems.  See Kopelman, 
“Female Circumcision/Genital Mutilation and Ethical Relativism” and Ruth Benedict, “Anthropology 
and Abnormal”.  Both can be found in Moral Relativism, edited by Paul Moser and Thomas Carson 
(Oxford University Press, 2001), at pp. 307-326 and 80-89, respectively. 
39 My guess is that she would rely on concepts of moral parity of viewpoints and personhood, both derived 
from Kant.  (The first of these she discusses in order to criticize, but leaves open the possibility of adopting 
mutual recognition but accepting different forms of it.)  If she would, then it is not clear why we should 
not think that her concepts—and not just specific forms of them—should be allowed universal 
applicability. Furthermore, her view does not really allow for “multimundialism”, since she claims 
universal applicability of the most fundamental moral judgments. 
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condemnation of others, rescuing people, and taking sides in disputes as normative 
considerations in refusing normative insularity and allowing that normative critiques 
are genuine disputes. Her response is to charge moral universalism with moral errors 
which have led to moral atrocities:  Unimundialism, she says, “refuses to acknowledge 
the genuine differences there are in human situations and the implication that one’s 
own moral values may have only local normative force—the moral concern here is that 
refusing to recognize this can be a moral mistake, a mistake that has arguably been 
repeated throughout the long history of conquest and colonization, in which 
conquerors and colonizers wrongly assumed that any moral differences they encountered 
must be instances of ignorance and error.” (p. 281)  No mention is made of 
consequentialism, a type of Unimundialism which would seem to take into account 
differences in circumstances, just as Rovane wishes, and in exactly the way she would 
wish. 
There is only one form of moral problem in Rovane’s world—intercultural. Not 
only is the one type of moral atrocity cited the one of “conquerors and colonizers,” her 
references to morality assume cultural unity. She refers to “the mistake supposing that 
the moral values by which we live have a normative force that reaches beyond the 
particular circumstances in which we are able to meaningfully live by them…” (pp. 
263-4) and to moral values “that we are not willing to adopt for ourselves.” (p. 264) 
Who is this “we”? Have “we” all adopted all of “our” moral values?  Have “they” all 
adopted “theirs”?  Just as with any sort of cultural relativism, the possibility of criticism 
of “one’s own” culture’s values is eliminated. 
Rovane’s views, intending to protect diversity, suffer predictable dialectical 
reversals. The Fugitive Slave Laws were normative insulation; the U.S. was 
“epistemically indifferent” to the pleas of many German Jewish refugees prior to 
WWII. Rovane fails to discuss how respecting the difference of others’ worlds involves 
treating people as groups and thus involves reinforcing structures of domination within 
cultures and taking sides in internal conflicts whether one wishes or not. Furthermore, 
with no conceptual distance provided between norms and problem-solving, Rovane’s 
view will run up against a problem regarding norms similar to the one noted above for 
Braver with regard to tying truth to practices. Social institutions which are ways of 
solving problems will ipso facto be legitimized, thus making colonialism and slavery (of 
those from other “worlds”) acceptable as a solution to problems of work and profit. 
Seeing culture as problem-solving would allow accepting as legitimate some claimed 
“solutions”, like maintaining racial hierarchy, that many of us (and I hope Rovane) 
would not accept as legitimate. 
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d.  Interpretation is Perilous 
Interpreting philosophers in a specific tradition may present difficulties which differ 
from those involved in interpreting philosophers of another tradition. Overcoming 
these difficulties may be especially difficult, since those working within a single 
tradition often don’t have to face the difficulties of interpretation in the same way. The 
term “clarity” often applies to what is a consensus within a tradition, rather than 
something written in a way that can be understood across traditions.  
Samuel Wheeler’s essay on Derrida and Davidson illustrates one type of such 
difficulty. Wheeler focuses on the topic of metaphor in their works, and argues that 
bringing their work together is mutually beneficial for their respective positions. 
Wheeler provides a careful and insightful reading of Derrida’s “White Mythology”, 
which is a significant accomplishment given the difficulty of the essay. However, his 
attempt to instigate a mutually productive interaction runs aground on an interpretive 
problem—not in terms of the specific essay, but in terms of Derrida’s philosophy as a 
whole. The problem has to do with Derrida’s position vis-à-vis metaphysics. 
 Wheeler begins his essay with the important (but mistaken) claim that Derrida and 
Davidson share a common philosophical orientation:  “Derrida and Davidson are both 
anti-metaphysical.” (p. 172)  According to Wheeler, “Derrida regards metaphysics as a 
pervasive set of notions that dominate our thought on almost every topic.” (p. 173)  The 
problem is that Wheeler omits Derrida’s claim that there is no escape from 
metaphysics. Metaphysics dominates our thought according to Derrida, not on almost 
every topic, but on every topic. Arguing that one can dissolve metaphysical problems 
doesn’t supplement Derrida’s thought, as Wheeler says, but defeats it (and perhaps 
improves it40). 
Taking Derrida’s claims on metaphysics more seriously might have led Wheeler to 
give less credence to Davidson’s claims to successfully dissolve metaphysical concepts. 
In fact, Davidson’s work, in the terms that Wheeler presents it, seems open to 
deconstruction of a very straightforward sort for reasons explained very clearly and 
convincingly in Wheeler’s reading of Derrida’s essay on metaphor. For Davidson, 
according to Wheeler, “A central thesis of his philosophy of language is that semantics 
should be sharply separated from what speakers are doing with sentences.” (p. 182)  
Derrida, as Wheeler points out, denies that sentences (and other connections of words) 
can “be systematically divided into the logical and the rhetorical”. The deconstruction 
would work by showing that what was excluded at the level of sentences returns at the 
                                                          
40 I agree with the anti-metaphysical position Wheeler wants to reach—defeat capital T Truth in favor of 
truth. (p. 186)  I don’t think Davidson’s approach is going to reach that goal. 
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level of words—they will have rhetorical force because, as Wheeler says, “Derrida, 
following Hegel and Heidegger, thinks of the origins of concepts as continuing to be 
relevant as those concepts are used historically.” (p. 184)  It might be thought that the 
Davidsonian reply, according to Wheeler, is that words only have their literal 
meanings, and thus “Most metaphors are in fact false sentences. The Earth is not really 
a floor, even though Dante says it is. The literal meaning is the only meaning the 
sentence has.” (p. 182)   This appears to be a flat denial of the Derridean view. That 
such a denial doesn’t work, would be shown by noting the appeal to the falsity of the 
sentences, hence the appeal to the concept of truth, and then focusing on the following 
sentence:  Davidson “takes truth to be a primitive concept intimately tied to our 
understanding of ourselves and the world, whose structure is illuminated by the Tarski 
truth definition.” (p. 183)  The words in this sentence that would need to be examined 
are: primitive, concept, intimately, tied, world, structure, illuminated, definition. The 
Davidsonian would have to show in each case that one can rigorously distinguish 
between the literal and non-literal meanings; otherwise, one is led into a self-referential 
mise-en-abyme. At this point, the deconstruction could take two turns. First, it could 
examine Davidson’s view that the meaning of metaphor depends on the speaker’s 
purpose in using the sentence. The Derridean would then turn to the philosophy of 
mind underpinning the view, following Derrida’s treatment of Husserl in Speech and 
Phenomena. (I would also note that I think that most analytic philosophers who follow 
Davidson’s appropriation of Tarski believe that one of its advantages is that it would 
seem to avoid issues in the philosophy of mind.41)  The second turn could be to 
examine the concept of “illumination” in this sentence in particular. This is the key 
sentence in justifying Davidson’s view, so that the cost of Davidson’s view is that his 
philosophical discourse is false. (Even if one could rigorously separate the literal and 
metaphorical meanings of “illumination” as used here, “illumination” is clearly 
metaphorical, making it likely that this statement is a false statement, or possibly, 
undecidably true or false, since we would have to determine Davidson’s purpose in 
presenting this sentence (182).)  Fittingly, the metaphor of “illumination”, the central 
metaphor of philosophy according to Derrida, underlies the Davidsonian claim that 
one can “sharply separate” literal from non-literal meanings. The sentence is a false 
statement.   
While the deconstruction will be concerned with elaborating the paradoxes 
involved, I would note that the deconstruction works here because Tarski’s truth theory 
(and Davidson’s use of it) involves the attempt to remove truth and meaning from 
                                                          
41 This is worth considering in connection to Smith’s essay, discussed above. 
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history. On the views I have been pushing in this review, the sentence is false in a 
different (but related) manner. It is false because, looking to formal languages, which 
are atemporal and ahistorical, Davidson’s theory of truth and meaning is not 
illuminating in any way—literally or metaphorically. I don’t think anyone would think 
that Tarski’s theory of truth was illuminating who didn’t take formal languages as the 
paradigm of knowing. 
The essay by Eldridge and Lorraine illustrate these dangers in a different way. 
They propose that we should look at philosophy as a kind of “conceptual articulation”, 
arguing that bringing together Austin and Deleuze will be helpful in this endeavor. The 
project seems promising, since as they stress, Austin’s view of language is “practice-
directed” and Deleuze sees concepts as “events of thought”. The metaphilosophical 
questions are important, and the emphasis on temporality bodes well. Bringing 
attention back to Austin is something I would cheer. 
Two problems interfere. The first involves interpretation. After presenting some of 
Austin’s essays as a way of showing his way of working, they ask, “What exactly is 
Austin doing…?” (p. 64)  They answer, following a couple of Cavell’s followers, that he 
is doing what Kant says in the third Critique we do when we are talking about art. 
Much of their description here is innocuous enough to apply to any utterance (“felt 
satisfaction and rightness” (p. 65)), other parts get closer to something specifically 
aesthetic (“the achievement of a kind of heightened life”). While this sounds more to 
me like Cavell’s project than Austin’s, I am not raising this point to contest any specific 
point of interpretation; this seems like a different and more important kind of 
interpretive error.  This seems like a huge leap which contravenes Austin’s entire way of 
working.  The care, caution and patience which was characteristic of Austin’s essays 
goes out the window. 
The second problem is their attempt, similar to the problems noted in OGB, to 
demarcate the conceptual from the empirical. They begin the essay by setting up two 
alternatives with regard to concepts—Platonism and reductive materialism, the latter of 
which they offer as the only “empiricist” approach to concepts. Other empirical 
disciplines—history, sociology—are not considered. The appeal to the third Critique 
thus provides the same options that OGB tended to fall back on—math/physics or 
art.42  Since art is historical, the appeal to art is not entirely out of the question. But 
Kant treats art as ahistorical. And why not, Kant or no Kant, take a more direct 
approach to the task of thinking historically—e.g., thinking about history?  This essay 
                                                          
42 This appeal to art connects more directly to Deleuze, as they present Deleuze’s conception of 
philosophy.   
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is not the only one where the absence of philosophy of history as a presence in 
American philosophy departments and the philosophical curriculum is sorely missed. 
e.  Time (and history) is not enough. 
The above discussion of Eldridge and Lorraine’s essay and of Braver’s illustrates the 
insufficiency of bringing time into view without further reflection. Without attention to 
the questions of what time is, about the temporality of time, one might say, one is likely 
to miss the variety of ways that considerations of time or history can be neutralized.   
f.  De-emphasis of Social and Political Philosophy 
In BCL, there is no feminist theory, no critical race theory, no discussions of hierarchy, 
the environment, or technology. In spite of the concerns for social and political matters, 
the overwhelming impression left by this book is that pluralism involves metaphysics 
and epistemology to the detriment of political and social theory. The answer is 
apparent in the title of the last section of the editors’ introduction: “New (Problematic) 
Foundations for Action and Practice”. (p. 10)  In the most traditional manner, the 
concern for foundations—no matter how problematic those foundations are accepted 
to be—interferes with philosophical discussion of practice. And if we are faced with a 
choice between crossing the analytic/Continental divide or crossing the 
foundations/practice divide—a big if, which I would not subscribe to, but that is the 
impression provided by this book—it is not at all clear from the results that the editors 
have made the right choice. 
Livingston’s essay on Heidegger and Wittgenstein is an example. His approach is 
offered to address concerns about “the contemporary global regime of capital, 
technology, and information” which he wishes to approach through “a critical 
reflection on the unity of the world”. (241) However, instead of addressing capital, 
technology, or information, he addresses “foundational problems about logic, sense, 
and meaning, and the totality of the world…” (p. 237)  
Another example is the essay by Dan Zahavi and Glenda Zatne which closes the 
book, “Varieties of Shared Intentionality”. Zahavi and Zatne are critical of current 
accounts of collective intentionality for, among other reasons, analyzing “it in 
abstraction from the various specific forms that social relationships assume in actual 
and historical contexts.” (p. 104)  Their treatment suffers from the same problem. They 
discuss different varieties of collective intentionality, but they do so without explaining 
how these differences matter for any philosophical problems. This is a result from their 
concern with ahistorical philosophers as their touchstones—Bratman, Husserl, other 
phenomenologists, Quine, and Davidson. There is no discussion of sociology. 
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The possibility is definitely there. One valuable contribution they make is the 
discussion of the dissertation of the phenomenologist Gerda Walther from 1923, of 
whom I was not aware. Walther’s work is presented as describing different ways 
communities constitute themselves, these differences demarcating different kinds of 
communities. The historical resonances suggested could be fascinating, if one considers 
the relationship between this work and the distinction between community and society 
which was prevalent in German social thought at the time. Did Walther discuss that 
distinction?  How does her typology interact with that distinction?  Does it, by 
describing both face-to-face communities and non-face-to-face communities as both 
types of communities soften that distinction (which was often used to impugn modern 
urban life)?  Or, because it considers them as different types of communities, does it 
reinforce that distinction?  Zahavi and Satne do not broach these issues. 
Instead, we get a discussion of Davidson in support of universal community, in line 
with Husserl’s claims. What we have are attempts to bring ahistorical theories of 
mathematicians and logicians in accord with the challenges that history poses for their 
theories. Why not start with history or historical thinkers?  
 
*** 
At the spring 2015 Pacific Division meeting of the APA in Vancouver, Catherine 
MacKinnon, probably the most important American philosopher of the last half 
century, spoke at a session marking the 25th year since the publication of Toward a 
Feminist Theory of  the State. It was said that this was the first time she had ever spoken at 
an APA meeting. In what follows, I am relying on my memory of the occasion. 
One of the speakers suggested that MacKinnon’s work be seen in the context of 
major 20th Century Continental philosophers, taking Heidegger as her example. In her 
reply, MacKinnon agreed with the general point, but said that Foucault was the better 
term of comparison. She said that her analysis of knowledge was the same as Foucault’s 
concept of “power/knowledge”, but that there were two important differences. First, 
she was unhappy with the workings of knowledge, while Foucault was happy about it. 
Second, she was pilloried for her analysis of knowledge, while Foucault was hailed as a 
genius.43 
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43 I am very grateful to Scott Anderson, Jeff Kasser, and Lee Kerchkove for very helpful comments on a 
draft of this essay.  They certainly should not be blamed for the views expressed or the errors that remain. 
